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Abstract. In this paper, we explore Bertrand and Cournot Mean Field Games models
for market competition with reflection boundary conditions. We prove existence, unique-
ness and regularity of solutions to the system of equations, and show that this system
can be written as an optimality condition of a convex minimization problem. We also
provide a short proof of uniqueness to the system addressed in [Graber, P. and Ben-
soussan, A., Existence and uniqueness of solutions for Bertrand and Cournot mean field
games, Applied Mathematics & Optimization (2016)], where uniqueness was only proved
for small parameters ǫ. Finally, we prove existence and uniqueness of a weak solutions
to the corresponding first order system at the deterministic limit.
1. Introduction
Our purpose is to study the following coupled system of partial differential equations:
(1.1)


(i) ut +
σ2
2 uxx − ru+G(ux,m)
2 = 0, 0 < t < T, 0 < x < L
(ii) mt −
σ2
2 mxx − {G(ux,m)m}x = 0, 0 < t < T, 0 < x < L
(iii) m(0, x) = m0(x), u(T, x) = uT (x), 0 ≤ x ≤ L
(iv) ux(t, 0) = ux(t, L) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
(v) σ
2
2 mx(t, x) +G(ux,m)m(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ {0, L}
where G(ux,m) :=
1
2
(
b+ c
∫ L
0 ux(t, y)m(t, y) dy − ux
)
, σ, b, c, T, L are given positive con-
stants, and m0(x), uT (x) are known functions.
System (1.1) is in the family of models introduced by Gue´ant, Lasry, and Lions [26] as
well as by Chan and Sircar in [16, 17] to describe a mean field game in which producers
compete to sell an exhaustible resource such as oil. The basic notion of mean field games
(MFG) was introduced by Lasry and Lions [28–30] and Caines, Huang, and Malhame´
[27]. Here we view the producers as a continuum of rational agents whose is given by
the function m(t, x) governed by a Fokker-Planck equation. Each of them must solve an
optimal control problem in order to optimize profit, which corresponds to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (1.1)(i). A solution to the coupled system therefore corresponds
(formally) to a Nash equilibrium among infinitely many competitors in the market.
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The analysis of this type of PDE system was already addressed in [25] with Dirichlet
boundary conditions at x = 0. It is a framework where producers have limited stock, and
they leave the market as soon as their stock is exhausted. In particular, the density of
players is a non-increasing function [25]. By contrast, in studying system (1.1) we explore
a new boundary condition. In terms of the model, we assume that players never leave the
game so that the number of producers in the market remains constant. In this particular
case, the density of players is a probability density for all the times, which considerably
simplifies the analysis of the system of equations. Further details on the interpretation of
the problem will be given below in Section 1.1.
Applications of mean field games to economics have attracted much recent interest;
see [1, 6, 18] for surveys of the topic. Nevertheless, most results from the PDE literature
on mean field games are not sufficient to establish well-posedness for models of market
behavior such as (1.1). In particular, many authors have studied existence and uniqueness
of solutions to systems of the type
(1.2)
ut +
1
2σ
2uxx − ru+H(t, x, ux) = V [m],
mt −
1
2σ
2mxx − (G(t, x, ux)m)x = 0.
See, for example, [9–13, 20–22, 31]. In all of these references, the equilibrium condition
is determined solely through the distribution of the state variable, rather than that of
the control. That is, each player faces a cost determined by the distribution of positions,
but not decisions, of other players. For economic production models, by contrast, players
must optimize against a cost determined by the distribution of controls, since the market
price is determined by aggregating all the prices (or quantities) set by individual firms. A
mathematical framework which takes this assumption into account has been called both
“extended mean field games” [19, 23] and “mean field games of controls” [14]. However,
other than the results of [14, 19, 23], there appear to be few existence and uniqueness
theorems for PDE models of this type. One of the main difficulties appears to be that the
coupling is inherently nonlocal, a feature which is manifest in (1.1) through the integral
term
∫ L
0 uxm dx.
Inspired by [25], our goal in this article is to prove the existence and uniqueness of
solutions to (1.1). Because of the change in boundary conditions, many of the arguments
becomes considerably simpler and stronger results are possible. Let us now outline our
main results. We show in Section 2 that there exists a unique classical solution of System
(1.1). Note that, whereas in [25], uniqueness was only proved for small values of ǫ :=
2c/(1− c) (cf. the interpretation in the following subsection), here we improve that result
by showing that solutions are unique for all values of ǫ (including in the case of Dirichlet
boundary conditions). We show in Section 3 that (1.1) has an interpretation as a system
of optimality for a convex minimization problem. Although this feature has been noticed
and exploited for mean field games with congestion penalization (see [5] for an overview),
here we show that it is also true for certain extended mean field games (cf. [24]). Finally,
in Section 4 we give an existence result for the first order case where σ = 0, using a
“vanishing viscosity” argument by collecting a priori estimates from Sections 2 and 3.
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1.1. Explanation of the model. We summarize the interpretation of (1.1) as follows.
Let t be time and x be the producer’s capacity. We assume there is a large set of producers
and represent it as a continuum.
The first equation in (1.1) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the
maximization of profit. Each producer’s capacity is driven by a stochastic differential
equation
(1.3) dX(s) = −q(s)ds+ σ dW (s),
where q is determined by the price p through a linear demand schedule
(1.4) q = D(p, p¯) =
1
1 + ǫ
− p+
ǫ
1 + ǫ
p¯, η > 0.
The presence of noise expresses the the short term unpredictable fluctuations of the de-
mand [16]. In (1.4) p¯ represents the market price, that is, the average price offered by all
producers; and ǫ is the product substitutability, with ǫ = 0 corresponding to independent
goods and ǫ = +∞ implying perfect substitutability. Thus each producer competes with
all the others by responding to the market price.
We define the value function
(1.5) u(t, x) := sup
p
E
{∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)p(s)q(s)ds+ e−r(T−t)uT (X(T )) | X(t) = x
}
where q(s) is given in terms of p(s) by (1.4). The optimization problem (1.5) has the
corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
(1.6) ut +
1
2
σ2uxx − ru+max
p
[(
1
1 + ǫ
− p+
ǫ
1 + ǫ
p¯(t)
)
(p− ux)
]
= 0.
The optimal p∗(t, x) satisfies the first order condition
(1.7) p∗(t, x) =
1
2
(
1
1 + ǫ
+
ǫ
1 + ǫ
p¯(t) + ux(t, x)
)
,
and we take q∗(t, x) to be the corresponding demand
(1.8) q∗(t, x) =
1
2
(
1
1 + ǫ
+
ǫ
1 + ǫ
p¯(t)− ux(t, x)
)
.
Therefore (1.6) becomes
(1.9) ut +
1
2
σ2uxx − ru+
1
4
(
1
1 + ǫ
+
ǫ
1 + ǫ
p¯(t)− ux
)2
= 0.
On the other hand, the density of producers m(t, x) is transported by the optimal
control (1.8); it is governed by the Fokker-Planck equation
(1.10) mt − (
1
2
σ2m)xx −
1
2
((
1
1 + ǫ
+
ǫ
1 + ǫ
p¯(t)− ux
)
m
)
x
= 0.
The coupling takes place through a market clearing condition. With p∗(t, x) the Nash
equilibrium price we must have
(1.11) p¯(t) =
∫ L
0
p∗(t, x)m(t, x) dx,
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which, thanks to (1.7), can be rewritten
(1.12) p¯(t) =
1
2 + ǫ
+
1 + ǫ
2 + ǫ
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx.
We recover System 1.1 by setting
(1.13) b =
2
2 + ǫ
, c =
ǫ
2 + ǫ
.
Boundary conditions. We assume that the maximum capacity of all producers does
not exceed L > 0. We consider a situation where players are able to renew their stock
after exhaustion, so that players stay all the time with a non empty stock. For the sake
of simplicity, we do not consider the implications of stock renewal on the cost structure.
This situation entails a reflection boundary condition at x = 0 instead of an absorbing
boundary condition. Therefore, we consider Neumann boundary conditions at x = 0 and
x = L.
1.2. Notation and assumptions. Throughout this article we defineQT := (0, T )×(0, L)
to be the domain, ST := ([0, T ] × {0, L}) ∪ ({T} × [0, L]) to be the parabolic boundary,
and at times ΓT := ([0, T ] × {0}) ∪ ({T} × [0, L]) to be the parabolic half-boundary. For
any domain X in R or R2 we define Lp(X), p ∈ [1,+∞] to be the Lebesgue space of
p-integrable functions on X; C0(X) to be the space of all continuous functions on X;
Cα(X), 0 < α < 1 to be the space of all Ho¨lder continuous functions with exponent α
on X; and Cn+α(X) to be the set of all functions whose n derivatives are all in Cα(X).
For a subset X ⊂ QT we also define C
1,2(X) to be the set of all functions on X which
are locally continuously differentiable in t and twice locally continuously differentiable in
x. By Cα/2,α(X) we denote the set of all functions which are locally Ho¨lder continuous in
time with exponent α/2 and in space with exponent α.
We will denote by C a generic constant, which depends only on the data (namely
uT ,m0, L, T, σ, r and ǫ). Its precise value may change from line to line.
Throughout we take the following assumptions on the data :
(1) uT and m0 are function in C
2+γ([0, L]) for some γ > 0.
(2) uT and m0 satisfy compatible boundary conditions : u
′
T (0) = u
′
T (L) = 0 and
m0(0) = m
′
0(0) = m0(L) = m
′
0(L) = 0.
(3) m0 is probability density.
(4) uT ≥ 0.
2. Analysis of the system
In this section we give a proof of existence and uniqueness for system (1.1). Note that
most results of this section are an adaptation of those of [25, section 2]. However, unlike
the case addressed in [25], we provide uniform bounds on u and ux which do not depend
on σ. We start by providing some a priori bounds on solutions to (1.1), then we prove
existence and uniqueness using the Leray-Schauder fixed point theorem.
Let us start with some basic properties of the solutions.
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Proposition 2.1. Let (u,m) be a pair of smooth solutions to (1.1). Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
m(t) is a probability density, and
(2.1) u(t, x) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ],∀x ∈ [0, L].
Moreover, for some constant C > 0 depending on the data, we have
(2.2)
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
mu2x ≤ C.
Proof. Using (1.1)(ii) and (1.1)(v), one easily checks that m(t) is a probability density for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, the arguments used to prove (2.1) and (2.2) in [25] hold also for
the system (1.1). 
Lemma 2.2. Let (u,m) be a pair of smooth solution to (1.1), then
(2.3) ‖u‖∞ + ‖ux‖∞ ≤ C,
where the constant C > 0 does not depend on σ. In particular we have that
(2.4) ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
∣∣∣∣
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C,
where C > 0 does not depend on σ.
Proof. As in [25, Lemma 2.3, Lemma 2.7], the result is a consequence of using the max-
imum principle for suitable functions. We give a proof highlighting the fact that C does
not depend on σ. Set f(t) := b+ c
∫ L
0 ux(t, y)m(t, y) dy, so that
−ut −
σ2
2
uxx + ru ≤
1
2
(
f2(t) + u2x
)
.
Owing to Proposition 2.1, f ∈ L2(0, T ). Moreover, if
w := exp
{
σ−2
(
u+
1
2
∫ t
0
f(s)2 ds
)}
− 1,
then we have
−wt −
σ2
2
wxx ≤ 0.
In particular w satisfies the maximum principle, and w ≤ µ everywhere, where
µ = max
0≤x≤L
exp
{
σ−2
(
uT +
1
2
∫ T
0
f(s)2 ds
)}
− 1.
Whence, 0 ≤ u ≤ σ2 ln(1 + µ), so that
‖u‖∞ ≤ ‖uT ‖∞ +
1
2
∫ T
0
f(s)2 ds.
On the other hand, we have that
max
ΓT
|ux| ≤ ‖u
′
T ‖∞, ΓT := ([0, T ] × {0, L}) ∪ ({T} × [0, L]),
so by using the maximum principle for the function w(t, x) = ux(t, x)e
−rt, we infer that
‖ux‖∞ ≤ e
rT ‖u′T ‖∞.

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Remark 2.3. Unlike in [25], where more sophisticated estimates are performed, the esti-
mation of the nonlocal term
∫ L
0 ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx follows easily in this case, owing to (2.3)
and the fact that m is a probability density.
Proposition 2.4. There exists a constant C > 0 depending on σ and data such that, if
(u,m) is a smooth solution to (1.1), then for some 0 < α < 1,
(2.5) ‖u‖C1+α/2,2+α(QT ) + ‖m‖C1+α/2,2+α(QT ) ≤ C.
Proof. See [25, Proposition 2.8]. 
We now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.5. There exists a unique classical solution to (1.1).
Proof. The proof of existence is the same as in [25, Theorem 3.1] and relies on Leray-
Schauder fixed point theorem. Let (u1,m1) and (u2,m2) be two solutions of (1.1), and
set u = u1 − u2 and m = m1 −m2. Define
Gi :=
1
2
(
b+ c
∫ L
0
ui,x(t, y)mi(t, y) dy − ui,x
)
.
Note that Gi can be written
Gi =
1
2
(
b
1− c
−
2c
1− c
G¯i − ui,x
)
, where G¯i :=
∫ L
0
Gi(t, y)mi(t, y) dy.
Integration by parts yields
(2.6)[
e−rt
∫ L
0
u(t, x)m(t, x) dx
]T
0
=
∫ T
0
e−rt
∫ L
0
(G22−G
2
1−G1ux)m1+(G
2
1−G
2
2+G2ux)m2 dxdt.
The left-hand side of (2.6) is zero. As for the right-hand side, we check that
G22 −G
2
1 −G1ux = (G2 −G1)
2 +
2c
1− c
G1(G¯1 − G¯2)
and, similarly,
G21 −G
2
2 +G2ux = (G2 −G1)
2 −
2c
1− c
G2(G¯1 − G¯2).
Then (2.6) becomes
(2.7) 0 =
∫ T
0
e−rt
∫ L
0
(G1 −G2)
2(m1 +m2) dxdt+
2c
1− c
∫ T
0
e−rt(G¯1 − G¯2)
2 dt.
It follows that G¯1 ≡ G¯2. Then by uniqueness for parabolic equations with quadratic
Hamiltonians, it follows that u1 ≡ u2. From uniqueness for the Fokker-Planck equation it
follows that m1 ≡ m2. 
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2.1. Uniqueness revisited for the model of Chan and Sircar. The authors of [16]
originally introduced the following model:
(2.8)


(i) ut +
1
2σ
2uxx − ru+G
2(t, ux, [mux]) = 0, 0 < t < T, 0 < x < L
(ii) mt −
1
2σ
2mxx − (G(t, ux, [mux])m)x = 0, 0 < t < T, 0 < x < L
(iii) m(0, x) = m0(x), u(T, x) = uT (x), 0 ≤ x ≤ L
(iv) u(t, 0) = m(t, 0) = 0, ux(t, L) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
(v) 12σ
2mx(t, L) +G(t, ux(t, L), [mux])m(t, L) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where
G(t, ux, [mux]) =
1
2
(
2
2 + ǫη(t)
+
ǫ
2 + ǫη(t)
∫ L
0
uξ(t, ξ)m(t, ξ)dξ − ux
)
,(2.9)
η(t) :=
∫ L
0
m(t, ξ)dξ
The main difference between (1.1) and (2.8) is that in (2.8) there are Dirichlet boundary
conditions on the left-hand side x = 0, which also means that m is no longer a density,
but might have decreasing mass. In [25], existence and uniqueness of classical solutions
for (2.8) is obtained. However, uniqueness was only proved for small parameters ǫ. Here
we improve this result by using the idea of the proof of Theorem 2.5. (The proof is in fact
much simpler than in [25].)
Theorem 2.6. There exists a unique classical solution of the system (2.8).
Proof. Existence was given in [25]. For uniqueness, let (u1,m1), (u2,m2) be two solutions,
and define u = u1 − u2,m = m1 −m2, and
Gi =
1
2
(
2
2 + ǫηi(t)
+
ǫ
2 + ǫηi(t)
∫ L
0
ui,ξ(t, ξ)mi(t, ξ)dξ − ui,x
)
,
ηi(t) :=
∫ L
0
mi(t, ξ)dξ.
Note that Gi can also be written
Gi =
1
2
(1− ǫG¯i − ui,x), where G¯i :=
∫ L
0
Gi(t, y)mi(t, y) dy.
Then integrating by parts as in the proof of Theorem 2.5, we obtain
(2.10) 0 =
∫ T
0
e−rt
∫ L
0
(G1 −G2)
2(m1 +m2) dxdt+ ǫ
∫ T
0
e−rt(G¯1 − G¯2)
2 dt.
We conclude as before. 
3. Optimal control of Fokker-Planck equation
The purpose of this section is to prove that (1.1) is a system of optimality for a convex
minimization problem. It was first noticed in the seminal paper by Lasry and Lions [30]
that systems of the form (1.2) have a formal interpretation in terms of optimal control.
Since then this property has been made rigorous and exploited to obtain well-posedness
in first-order [9, 10, 15] and degenerate cases [11]; see [5] for a nice discussion. However,
all of these references consider the case of congestion penalization, which results in an a
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priori summability estimate on the density. There is no such penalization in (1.1). Hence,
the optimality arguments used in [9], for example, appear insufficient in the present case
to prove existence and uniqueness of solutions to the first order system. Furthermore,
it is very difficult in the present context to formulate the dual problem, which in the
aforementioned works was an essential ingredient in proving existence of an adjoint state.
Nevertheless, aside from its intrinsic interest, we will see in Section 4 that optimality gives
us at least enough to pass to the limit as σ → 0.
We make the substitution b¯ =
b
1− c
, c¯ =
c
1− c
(so according to (1.13) we get b¯ = 1 and
c¯ = ǫ/2). Consider the optimization problem of minimizing the objective functional
(3.1) J(m, q) =
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt
(
q2(t, x)− b¯q(t, x)
)
m(t, x) dxdt
+ c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
q(t, y)m(t, y) dy
)2
dt−
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx
for (m, q) in the class K, defined as follows. Let m ∈ L1([0, T ] × [0, L]) be non-negative,
let q ∈ L2([0, T ] × [0, L]), and assume that m is a weak solution to the Fokker-Planck
equation
(3.2) mt −
σ2
2
mxx − (qm)x = 0, m(0) = m0,
equipped with Neumann boundary conditions, where weak solutions are defined as in [31]:
• the integrability condition mq2 ∈ L1([0, T ]× [0, L]) holds, and
• (3.2) holds in the sense of distributions–namely, for all φ ∈ C∞c ([0, T )× [0, L]) such
that φx(t, 0) = φx(t, L) = 0 for each t ∈ (0, T ), we have∫ T
0
∫ L
0
(−φt −
σ2
2
φxx + qφx)m dxdt =
∫ L
0
φ(0)m0 dx.
Then we say that (m, q) ∈ K. We refer the reader to [31] for properties of weak solutions
of (3.2), namely that they are unique and that they coincide with renormalized solutions
and for this reason have several useful properties. One property which will be of particular
interest to us is the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 (Proposition 3.10 in [31]). Let (m, q) ∈ K, i.e. let m be a weak solution of
the Fokker-Planck equation (3.2). Then ‖m(t)‖L1([0,L]) = ‖m0‖L1([0,L]) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, if logm0 ∈ L
1([0, L]), then for any
(3.3) ‖ logm(t)‖L1([0,L]) ≤ C(‖ logm0‖L1([0,L]) + 1) ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where C depends on ‖q‖L2 and ‖m0‖L1 . In particular, if logm0 ∈ L
1([0, L]) and (m, q) in
K, then m > 0 a.e.
Proposition 3.2. Let (u,m) be a solution of (1.1). Set
q =
1
2
(
b+ c
∫ L
0
ux(t, y)m(t, y) dy − ux
)
.
Then (m, q) is a minimizer for problem (3.1), that is, J(m, q) ≤ J(m˜, q˜) for all (m˜, q˜)
satisfying (3.2). Moreover, if logm0 ∈ L
1([0, L]) then the maximizer is unique.
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Proof. It is useful to keep in mind that the proof is based on the convexity of J following
a change of variables. By abuse of notation we might write
J(m,w) =
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt
(
w2(t, x)
m(t, x)
− b¯w(t, x)
)
dxdt
+ c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
w(t, y) dy
)2
dt−
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx,
cf. the change of variables used in [4] and several works which cite that paper. However,
in this context we prefer a direct proof.
Using the algebraic identity
q˜2m˜− q2m = 2q(q˜m˜− qm)− q2(m˜−m) + m˜(q˜ − q)2,
we have
(3.4)
J(m˜, q˜)−J(m, q) = c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
q˜m˜− qm dy
)2
dt−
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)(m˜−m)(T, x) dx
+ 2c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
q˜m˜− qm dy
)(∫ L
0
qm dy
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt
(
b¯(qm− q˜m˜) + 2q(q˜m˜− qm)− q2(m˜−m) + m˜(q˜ − q)2
)
dxdt.
Now using the fact that u is a smooth solution of
(3.5) ut +
σ2
2
uxx − ru+ q
2 = 0, u(T ) = 0, ux|0,L = 0
and since
(m˜−m)t −
σ2
2
(m˜−m)xx − (q˜m˜− qm)x = 0, (m˜−m)(0) = 0
in the sense of distributions, it follows that
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtq2(m˜−m) dxdt+
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)(m˜−m)(T, x) dx
= −
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt(q˜m˜− qm)ux dxdt.
Putting this into (3.4) and rearranging, we have
(3.6) J(m˜, q˜)− J(m, q) =
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt(qm− q˜m˜)
(
b¯− 2q − 2c¯
∫ L
0
qm dy − ux
)
dxdt
+
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtm˜(q˜ − q)2 dxdt+ c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
q˜m˜− qm dx
)2
dt.
To conclude that J(m˜, q˜) ≥ J(m, q), it suffices to prove that
(3.7) b¯− 2q − 2c¯
∫ L
0
qm dy − ux = 0.
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Recall the definition
q =
1
2
(
b+ c
∫ L
0
ux(t, y)m(t, y) dy − ux
)
.
Integrate both sides against m and rearrange, using the definition of the constants b¯, c¯ to
get ∫
uxm dy = b¯− 2(c¯+ 1)
∫
qm dy.
Plugging this into the definition of q proves (3.7). Thus (m, q) is a minimizer.
On the other hand, suppose logm0 ∈ L
1([0, L]) and that (m˜, q˜) is another minimizer.
Then (3.6) implies that
(3.8)
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtm˜(q˜ − q)2 dxdt+ c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
q˜m˜− qm dx
)2
dt = 0.
Now by Lemma 3.1, we have m˜ > 0 a.e. Therefore (3.8) implies q˜ = q. By uniqueness for
the Fokker-Planck equation, we conclude that m˜ = m as well. The proof is complete. 
Remark 3.3. A similar argument shows that System (2.8), with Dirichlet boundary con-
ditions on the left-hand side, is also a system of optimality for the same minimization
problem, except this time with Dirichlet boundary conditions (on the left-hand side) im-
posed on the Fokker-Planck equation. We omit the details.
4. First-order case
In this section we use a vanishing viscosity method to prove that (1.1) has a solution
even when we plug in σ = 0. We need to collect some estimates which are uniform in σ
as σ → 0. From now on we will assume 0 < σ ≤ 1, and whenever a constant C appears it
does not depend on σ.
Lemma 4.1. ‖ut‖2 ≤ C.
Proof. We first prove that σ2‖uxx‖2 ≤ C. For this, multiply
(4.1) uxt − rux +
σ2
2
uxxx −Guxx = 0
by ux and integrate by parts. We get, after using Young’s inequality and (2.3),
σ4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
u2xx dxdt ≤ 4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
(Gux)
2 dxdt+ 2σ2
∫ L
0
u′T (x)
2 dx ≤ C,
as desired.
Then the claim follows from (1.1)(i) and Lemma 2.2. 
Lemma 4.2. ‖u‖C1/3 ≤ C.
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Proof. Since ‖ux‖∞ ≤ C it is enough to show that u is 1/3-Ho¨lder continuous in time. Let
t1 < t2 in [0, T ] be given. Set η > 0 to be chosen later. We have, by Ho¨lder’s inequality,
(4.2) |u(t1, x)− u(t2, x)| ≤ Cη +
1
η
∫ x+η
x−η
|u(t1, ξ)− u(t2, ξ)|dξ
≤ Cη +
1
η
∫ x+η
x−η
∫ t2
t1
|ut(s, ξ)|ds dξ
≤ Cη +
1
η
‖ut‖2
√
2η|t2 − t1| ≤ Cη + C|t2 − t1|
1/2η−1/2.
Setting η = |t2 − t1|
1/3 proves the claim. 
To prove compactness estimates for m, we will first use the fact that it is the minimizer
for an optimization problem. Let us reintroduce the optimization problem from Section 3
with σ ≥ 0 as a variable. We first define the convex functional
(4.3) Ψ(m,w) :=


|w|2
m if m 6= 0,
0 if w = 0,m = 0,
+∞ if w 6= 0,m = 0.
Now we rewrite the functional J , with a slight abuse of notation, as
(4.4) J(m,w) =
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt
(
Ψ(m(t, x), w(t, x)) − b¯w(t, x)
)
dxdt
+ c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
w(t, y) dy
)2
dt−
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx,
and consider the problem of minimizing over the class Kσ, defined here as the set of all
pairs (m,w) ∈ L1((0, T ) × (0, L))+ × L
1((0, T ) × (0, L);Rd) such that
(4.5) mt −
σ2
2
mxx − wx = 0, m(0) = m0
in the sense of distributions. By Proposition 3.2, for every σ > 0, J has a minimizer in Kσ
given by (m,w) = (m,Gm) where (u,m) is the solution of System (1.1). Since (m,w) is a
minimizer, we can derive a priori bounds which imply, in particular, that m(t) is Ho¨lder
continuous in the Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance on the space of probability measures,
with norm bounded uniformly in σ. We recall that the Kantorovich-Rubinstein metric on
P(Ω), the space of Borel probability measures on Ω, is defined by
d1(µ, ν) = inf
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
Ω×Ω
|x− y|dπ(x, y),
where Π(µ, ν) is the set of all probability measures on Ω×Ω whose first marginal is µ and
whose second marginal is ν. Here we consider Ω = (0, L).
Lemma 4.3. There exists a constant C independent of σ such that
‖|w|2/m‖L1((0,T )×(0,L)) ≤ C.
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As a corollary, m is 1/2-Ho¨lder continuous from [0, T ] into P((0, L)), and there exists a
constant (again denoted C) independent of σ such that
(4.6) d1(m(t1),m(t2)) ≤ C|t1 − t2|
1/2.
Proof. To see that ‖|w|2/m‖L1((0,T )×(0,L)) ≤ C, use (m0, 0) ∈ K as a comparison. By the
fact that J(m,w) ≤ J(m0, 0) we have
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt
|w|2
2m
dxdt+ c¯
∫ T
0
e−rt
(∫ L
0
w dx
)2
dt
≤
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (m(T )−m0) dx+
b¯
2
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtm dxdt ≤ C.
The Ho¨lder estimate (4.6) follows from [11, Lemma 4.1]. 
We also have compactness in L1, which comes from the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. For every K ≥ 0, we have
(4.7)
∫
m(t)≥2K
m(t) dx ≤ 2
∫ L
0
(m0 −K)+ dx
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Let K ≥ 0 be given. We define the following auxiliary functions:
(4.8)
φα,δ(s) :=


0 if s ≤ K,
1
6(1 + α)αδ
α−2(s −K)3 if K ≤ s ≤ K + δ,
1
6(1 + α)αδ
α+1 + 12(1 + α)αδ
α(s −K) + (s−K)1+α if s ≥ K + δ,
where α, δ ∈ (0, 1) are parameters going to zero. For reference we note that
(4.9) φ′α,δ(s) =


0 if s ≤ K,
1
2(1 + α)αδ
α−2(s−K)2 if K ≤ s ≤ K + δ,
1
2(1 + α)αδ
α + (1 + α)(s −K)α if s ≥ K + δ,
and
(4.10) φ′′α,δ(s) =


0 if s ≤ K,
(1 + α)αδα−2(s−K) if K ≤ s ≤ K + δ,
(1 + α)α(s −K)α−1 if s ≥ K + δ.
Observe that φ′′α,δ is continuous and non-negative. Multiply (1.1)(ii) by φ
′
α,δ(m) and
integrate by parts. After using Young’s inequality we have
(4.11)
∫ L
0
φα,δ(m(t)) dx ≤
∫ L
0
φα,δ(m0) dx+
‖G‖2∞
2σ2
∫ t
0
∫ L
0
φ′′α,δ(m)m
2 dxdt.
Since φ′′α,δ(s) ≤ (1 + α)αδ
−2, after taking α→ 0 we have
(4.12)
∫ L
0
φδ(m(t)) dx ≤
∫ L
0
φδ(m0) dx,
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where φδ(s) = (s −K)χ[K+δ,∞)(s). Now letting δ → 0 we see that
(4.13)
∫ L
0
(m(t)−K)+ dx ≤
∫ L
0
(m0 −K)+ dx,
where s+ := (s+ |s|)/2 denotes the positive part. Whence
(4.14)
∫ L
0
(mσ(t)−K)+ dx ≤
∫ L
0
(m0 −K)+ dx,
which also implies (4.7). 
We also have a compactness estimate for the function t 7→
∫ L
0 ux(t, y)m(t, y) dy.
Lemma 4.5. σ2
(∫ T
0
∫ L
0
|mx|2
m+1 dxdt
)1/2
≤ C.
Proof. Multiply the Fokker-Planck equation by log(m + 1) and integrate by parts. After
using Young’s inequality, we obtain
σ4
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
|mx|
2
m+ 1
dxdt ≤ σ2
∫ L
0
((m0 + 1) log(m0 + 1)−m0) dx+‖G‖
2
∞
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
m2
m+ 1
≤
∫ L
0
((m0 + 1) log(m0 + 1)−m0) dx+ ‖G‖
2
∞
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
m dxdt ≤ C.

Lemma 4.6. Let ζ ∈ C∞c ((0, L)). Then t 7→
∫ L
0 ux(t, x)m(t, x)ζ(x) dx is 1/2-Ho¨lder
continuous, and in particular,
(4.15)
∣∣∣∣∣
[∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x)ζ(x) dx
]t2
t1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cζ |t1 − t2|1/2
where Cζ is a constant that depends on ζ but not on σ.
Proof. Integration by parts yields
(4.16)
[
e−rt
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x)ζ(x) dx
]t2
t1
= −σ2
∫ t2
t1
e−rs
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)mx(t, x)ζ
′(x) dxds−
σ2
2
∫ t2
t1
e−rs
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x)ζ
′′(x) dxds
−
1
2
∫ t2
t1
{(
b+ c
∫ L
0
ux(t)m(t)
)∫ L
0
ζxuxm dx−
∫ L
0
ζxu
2
xm dx
}
ds.
On the one hand,∣∣∣∣σ
2
2
∫ t2
t1
e−rs
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x)ζ
′′(x) dxds
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖ux‖∞‖ζ
′′‖∞
2
|t1 − t2| ≤ C‖ζ
′′‖∞|t1 − t2|,
and∣∣∣∣
∫ t2
t1
{(
b+ c
∫ L
0
ux(t)m(t)
)∫ L
0
ζxuxm dx−
∫ L
0
ζxu
2
xm dx
}
ds
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C‖ζ ′‖∞‖ux‖2∞|t1−t2|.
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On the other hand, by Ho¨lder’s inequality and Lemma 4.5 we get
∣∣∣∣σ2
∫ t2
t1
e−rs
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)mx(t, x)ζ
′(x) dxds
∣∣∣∣
≤ ‖ux‖∞‖ζ
′‖∞σ
2
(∫ t2
t1
∫ L
0
|mx|
2
m+ 1
dxds
)1/2(∫ t2
t1
∫ L
0
(m+ 1) dxds
)1/2
≤ C‖ζ ′‖∞(L+ 1)
1/2|t1 − t2|
1/2.

Corollary 4.7. The function t 7→
∫ L
0 ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx is uniformly continuous with mod-
ulus of continuity independent of σ.
Proof. Let δ ∈ (0, L) and fix ζ ∈ C∞c ((0, L)) be such that 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 and ζ ≡ 1 on [δ, L−δ].
Notice that for any t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ]
(4.17)∣∣∣∣∣
[∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x)(1 − ζ(x)) dx
]t2
t1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖ux‖∞
∫
[0,L]\[δ,L−δ]
[m(t1, x) +m(t2, x)] dx.
Now by Lemma 4.4 we have
(4.18)
∫
[0,L]\[δ,L−δ]
m(t, x) dx
≤
∫
{m(t)<2K}∩[0,L]\[δ,L−δ]
m(t, x) dx+
∫
{m(t)≥2K}
m(t, x) dx ≤ 4Kδ+2
∫ L
0
(m0−K)+ dx
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Combine (4.17) and (4.18) with Lemmas 4.6 and 2.2 to get
(4.19)∣∣∣∣∣
[∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx
]t2
t1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cζ |t1 − t2|1/2 +CKδ+C
∫ L
0
(m0 −K)+ dx ∀t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ].
Let η > 0 be given. Set K large enough such that C
∫ L
0 (m0 −K)+ dx < η/3, then pick δ
small enough that CKδ < η/3. Finally, fix ζ as described above. Equation (4.19) implies
that if |t1 − t2| < η
2/(9C2ζ ), we have
∣∣∣∣
[∫ L
0 ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx
]t2
t1
∣∣∣∣ < η. Thus the function
t 7→
∫ L
0 ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx is uniformly continuous, and since none of the constants here
depend on σ, the modulus of continuity is independent of σ. 
We are now in a position to prove an existence result for the first-order system.
Theorem 4.8. There exists a unique pair (u,m) which solves System (1.1) in the following
sense:
(1) u ∈ W 1,2([0, T ] × [0, L]) ∩ L∞(0, T ;W 1,∞(0, L)) is a continuous solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(4.20) ut − ru+
1
4
(f(t)− ux)
2 = 0, u(T, x) = uT (x),
equipped with Neumann boundary conditions, in the viscosity sense;
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(2) m ∈ L1 ∩ C([0, T ];P([0, L])) satisfies the continuity equation
(4.21) mt −
1
2
((f(t)− ux)m)x = 0, m(0) = m0,
equipped with Neumann boundary conditions, in the sense of distributions; and
(3) f(t) = b+ c
∫ L
0 ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx a.e.
Proof. Existence: Collecting Lemmas 2.2, 4.1 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and Corollary 4.7, we can
construct a sequence σn → 0
+ such that if (un,mn) is the solution corresponding to
σ = σn, we have
• un → u uniformly, so that u ∈ C([0, T ] × [0, L]), and also weakly in W 1,2([0, T ] ×
[0, L]);
• unx ⇀ ux weakly
∗ in L∞;
• mn → m in C([0, T ];P([0, L])), so that m(t) is a well-defined probability measure
for every t ∈ [0, T ], mn ⇀ m weakly in L1([0, T ] × [0, L]), and mn(T ) ⇀ m(T )
weakly in L1([0, L]);
• mnunx ⇀ w weakly in L
1; and
• fn(t) := b+ c
∫ L
0 u
n
x(t, x)m
n(t, x) dx→ f(t) in C([0, T ]).
Since un → u and fn → f uniformly, by standard arguments, we have that (4.20) holds in
a viscosity sense. Moreover, since unx ⇀ ux weakly
∗ in L∞, we also have
(4.22) ut − ru+
1
4
(f(t)− ux)
2 ≤ 0
in the sense of distributions, i.e. for all φ ∈ C∞([0, T ]× [0, L]) such that φ ≥ 0, we have
(4.23)
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)φ(T, x) dx−
∫ L
0
e−rTu(0, x)φ(0, x) dx
−
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtu(t, x)φt(t, x) dxdt+
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
(f(t)− ux(t, x))
2φ(t, x) dxdt ≤ 0.
(This follows from the convexity of ux 7→ u
2
x.)
Since mn ⇀m and mnunx ⇀ w weakly in L
1, it also follows that
(4.24) mt −
1
2
(f(t)m− w)x = 0, m(0) = m0
in the sense of distributions. For convenience we define υ := 12 (f(t)m − w). Extend the
definition of (m,υ) so that m(t, x) = m(T, x) for t ≥ T , m(t, x) = m0(x) for t ≤ 0, and
m(t, x) = 0 for x /∈ [0, L]; and so that υ(t, x) = 0 for (t, x) /∈ [0, T ]× [0, L]. Now let ξδ(t, x)
be a standard convolution kernel (i.e. a C∞, positive function whose support is contained
in a ball of radius δ and such that
∫∫
ξδ(t, x) dxdt = 1). Set mδ = ξδ ∗m and υδ = ξδ.
Then mδ, υδ are smooth functions such that ∂tmδ = ∂xυδ in [0, T ]× [0, L]; moreover mδ is
positive. Using mδ as a test function in (4.23) we get
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)mδ(T, x) dx−
∫ L
0
e−rTu(0, x)mδ(0, x) dx
+
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtuxυδ dxdt+
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
(f(t)− ux)
2mδ dxdt ≤ 0.
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Using the continuity of m(t) in P([0, L]) from Lemma 4.3, we see that
lim
δ→0+
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)mδ(T, x) dx =
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx,
and limδ→0+
∫ L
0 e
−rTu(0, x)mδ(0, x) dx =
∫ L
0 e
−rTu(0, x)m0(x) dx. Since mδ → m and
υδ → υ in L
1, we have
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx−
∫ L
0
e−rTu(0, x)m0(x) dx
+
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtuxυ dxdt+
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
(f(t)− ux)
2m dxdt ≤ 0,
or
(4.25)
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx−
∫ L
0
e−rTu(0, x)m0(x) dx
+
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt
(
1
4
mu2x −
1
2
uxw
)
dxdt+
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
f2(t)m dt ≤ 0.
Recall the definition of Ψ(m,w) from (4.3). From (4.25) we have
(4.26)
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx−
∫ L
0
e−rTu(0, x)m0(x) dx
+
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
f2(t)m dt ≤
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtΨ(m,w) dxdt.
On the other hand, for each n we have
(4.27)
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m
n(T, x) dx−
∫ L
0
e−rTun(0, x)m0(x) dx
+
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
f2n(t)m
n dt =
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtmnu2x dxdt =
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtΨ(mn,mnunx) dxdt.
Since (mn,mnunx)⇀ (m,w) weakly in L
1 × L1, it follows from weak lower semicontinuity
that
(4.28)
∫ L
0
e−rTuT (x)m(T, x) dx−
∫ L
0
e−rTu(0, x)m0(x) dx
+
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
f2(t)m dt ≥
1
4
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rtΨ(m,w) dxdt.
From (4.25), (4.26), and (4.28) it follows that
∫ T
0
∫ L
0
e−rt(Ψ(m,w) +mu2x − 2uxw) dxdt = 0,
where Ψ(m,w) +mu2x − 2uxw is a non-negative function, hence zero almost everywhere.
We deduce that w = mux almost everywhere.
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Finally, by weak convergence we have
f(t) = b+ c lim
n→∞
∫ L
0
unx(t, x)m
n(t, x) dx = b+ c
∫ L
0
w(t, x) dx
= b+ c
∫ L
0
ux(t, x)m(t, x) dx a.e.
Which entails the existence part of the Theorem.
Uniqueness: The proof of uniqueness is essentially the same as for the second order case,
the only difference is the lack of regularity which makes the arguments much more subtle
invoking results for transport equations with a non-smooth vector field. Let (u1,m1) and
(u2,m2) be two solutions of system (1.1) in the sense given above, and let us set u := u1−u2
and m = m1−m2. We use a regularization process to get the energy estimate (2.7). Then
we get that u1 ≡ u2 and
∫ L
0 u1,xm1 =
∫ L
0 u2,xm2 in {m1 > 0} ∪ {m2 > 0}, so that m1 and
m2 are both solutions to
mt −
1
2
((f1(t)− u1,x)m)x = 0, m(0) = m0,
where f1(t) := b+ c
∫ L
0 u1,x(t, x)m1(t, x) dx and u1,x := (u1)x. In orded to conclude that
m1 ≡ m2, we invoke the following Lemma:
Lemma 4.9. Assume that v is a viscosity solution to
vt − rv +
1
4
(f1(t)− vx)
2 = 0, v(T, x) = uT (x),
then the transport equation
mt −
1
2
((f1(t)− vx)m)x = 0, m(0) = m0
possesses at most one weak solution in L1.
The proof of Lemma 4.9 (see e.g. [8, Section 4.2]) relies on semi-concavity estimates
for the solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations [7], and Ambrosio superposition principle
[2, 3]. 
References
[1] Yves Achdou, Francisco J Buera, Jean-Michel Lasry, Pierre-Louis Lions, and Benjamin Moll, Partial
differential equation models in macroeconomics, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of
London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 372 (2014), no. 2028.
[2] Luigi Ambrosio, Transport equation and cauchy problem for bv vector fields and applications, Journe´es
Equations aux De´rive´es Partielles (2004).
[3] , Transport equation and cauchy problem for non-smooth vector fields, LECTURE NOTES IN
MATHEMATICS-SPRINGER-VERLAG- 1927 (2008), 1.
[4] Jean-David Benamou and Yann Brenier, A computational fluid mechanics solution to the Monge-
Kantorovich mass transfer problem, Numerische Mathematik 84 (2000), no. 3, 375–393.
[5] Jean-David Benamou, Guillaume Carlier, and Filippo Santambrogio, Variational mean field games,
preprint, hal-01295299 (2016).
[6] Martin Burger, Luis Caffarelli, and Peter A Markowich, Partial differential equation models in the
socio-economic sciences, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences 372 (2014), no. 2028, 20130406.
18 P. JAMESON GRABER AND CHARAFEDDINE MOUZOUNI
[7] Piermarco Cannarsa and Carlo Sinestrari, Semiconcave functions, hamilton-jacobi equations, and op-
timal control, Vol. 58, Springer Science & Business Media, 2004.
[8] Pierre Cardaliaguet, Notes on mean field games, from P.-L. Lions lectures at College de France (2010).
[9] , Weak solutions for first order mean field games with local coupling, Analysis and geometry in
control theory and its applications, 2015, pp. 111–158.
[10] Pierre Cardaliaguet and P. Jameson Graber, Mean field games systems of first order, ESAIM: COCV
21 (2015), no. 3, 690–722.
[11] Pierre Cardaliaguet, P. Jameson Graber, Alessio Porretta, and Daniela Tonon, Second order mean field
games with degenerate diffusion and local coupling, Nonlinear Differential Equations and Applications
NoDEA 22 (2015), no. 5, 1287–1317 (English).
[12] Pierre Cardaliaguet, J-M Lasry, P-L Lions, and Alessio Porretta, Long time average of mean field
games with a nonlocal coupling, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 51 (2013), no. 5, 3558–
3591.
[13] Pierre Cardaliaguet, Jean-Michel Lasry, Pierre-Louis Lions, Alessio Porretta, et al., Long time average
of mean field games, Networks and Heterogeneous Media 7 (2012), no. 2, 279–301.
[14] Pierre Cardaliaguet and Charles-Albert Lehalle, Mean field game of controls and an application to
trade crowding, arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.09904 (2016).
[15] Pierre Cardaliaguet, Alpa´r Richa´rd Me´sza´ros, and Filippo Santambrogio, First order mean field games
with density constraints: Pressure equals price, arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.02019 (2015).
[16] Patrick Chan and Ronnie Sircar, Bertrand and Cournot mean field games, Applied Mathematics &
Optimization 71 (2015), no. 3, 533–569.
[17] , Fracking, renewables & mean field games, Available at SSRN 2632504 (2015).
[18] Diogo Gomes, Roberto M Velho, and Marie-Therese Wolfram, Socio-economic applications of finite
state mean field games, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences 372 (2014), no. 2028, 20130405.
[19] Diogo A Gomes, Stefania Patrizi, and Vardan Voskanyan, On the existence of classical solutions for
stationary extended mean field games, Nonlinear Analysis: Theory, Methods & Applications 99 (2014),
49–79.
[20] Diogo A Gomes and Edgard Pimentel, Time-dependent mean-field games with logarithmic nonlinear-
ities, SIAM Journal on Mathematical Analysis 47 (2015), no. 5, 3798–3812.
[21] Diogo A Gomes, Edgard Pimentel, and Hector Sa´nchez-Morgado, Time-dependent mean-field games
in the superquadratic case, ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations 22 (2016), no. 2,
562–580.
[22] Diogo A Gomes, Edgard A Pimentel, and He´ctor Sa´nchez-Morgado, Time-dependent mean-field games
in the subquadratic case, Communications in Partial Differential Equations 40 (2015), no. 1, 40–76.
[23] Diogo A Gomes and Vardan K Voskanyan, Extended deterministic mean-field games, SIAM Journal
on Control and Optimization 54 (2016), no. 2, 1030–1055.
[24] P Jameson Graber, Linear quadratic mean field type control and mean field games with common noise,
with application to production of an exhaustible resource, Applied Mathematics & Optimization 74
(2016), no. 3, 459–486.
[25] P. Jameson Graber and Alain Bensoussan, Existence and uniqueness of solutions for Bertrand and
Cournot mean field games, Applied Mathematics & Optimization (2016). Online first.
[26] Olivier Gue´ant, Jean-Michel Lasry, and Pierre-Louis Lions, Mean field games and applications, Paris-
Princeton lectures on mathematical finance 2010, 2011, pp. 205–266.
[27] Minyi Huang, Roland P Malhame´, and Peter E Caines, Large population stochastic dynamic games:
closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the nash certainty equivalence principle, Communications in
Information & Systems 6 (2006), no. 3, 221–252.
[28] Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions, Jeux a` champ moyen. I–Le cas stationnaire, Comptes
Rendus Mathe´matique 343 (2006), no. 9, 619–625.
[29] , Jeux a` champ moyen. II–Horizon fini et controˆle optimal, Comptes Rendus Mathe´matique
343 (2006), no. 10, 679–684.
VARIATIONAL MEAN FIELD GAMES FOR MARKET COMPETITION 19
[30] , Mean field games, Japanese Journal of Mathematics 2 (2007), no. 1, 229–260.
[31] Alessio Porretta, Weak solutions to Fokker–Planck equations and mean field games, Archive for Ra-
tional Mechanics and Analysis (2015), 1–62.
P. J. Graber: Baylor University, Department of Mathematics; One Bear Place #97328;
Waco, TX 76798-7328, Tel.: +1-254-710-, Fax: +1-254-710-3569
E-mail address: Jameson Graber@baylor.edu
C. Mouzouni: Univ Lyon, E´cole centrale de Lyon, CNRS UMR 5208, Institut Camille
Jordan, 36 avenue Guy de Collonge, F-69134 Ecully Cedex, France.
E-mail address: mouzouni@math.univ-lyon1.fr
